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LAWYERS' JUSTICE
William A. Edmundson*

AN ETHICAL STUDY. By David Luban.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xxix, 440. Cloth,
$55; paper, $12.95.
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:

THE SOCIAL REsPONSIBILmES OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES. By
Philip B. Heymann and Lance Liebman. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press 1988. Pp. xxvii, 354. Paper, $16.

David Luban's 1 thoroughgoing philosophical examination of legal
ethics may well come to define many of the terms of debate on the
subject, much as John Rawls' A Theory ofJustice has defined the terms
of debate in political theory in the years since its publication. The
premise of the book - and certainly a correct one - is that "our
nation is so dependent on its lawyers that their ethical problems transform themselves into public difficulties" (p. xviii). Luban's effort to
bring lawyers' ethics "before the 'tribunal of reason' itself" will no
doubt add considerable impetus to the growing public conversation
about law, lawyers, and justice.
Luban focuses upon what he terms the "standard conception" of
the lawyer's role. The standard conception is defined by two principles: a "principle of partisanship," which commits the lawyer to an
"extreme partisan zeal on behalf of the client"; and a "principle of
non-accountability," according to which "the lawyer bears no responsibility for the client's goals or the means used to attain them" (p. xx).
The book has two broad aims. The first is to show that in civil matters
the standard conception, and particularly its principle of nonaccountability, is untenable from the viewpoint of "secular ethical
thought" (p. xxvi). The second aim is to show that, with respect to
civil as well as criminal matters, relatively powerless individuals have
an implicit right under our principles of government to at least a minimal level of legal services, underwritten by the state. The two aims
could be summarized by saying that the first is to strip the powerful of
overzealous advocacy in the civil arena, and the second is to guarantee
zealous advocacy there to the powerless.
• Assistant Professor, The University of Mississippi School of Law. B.A. 1972, Antioch
College; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1982, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1985, Duke University. - Ed. I am indebted to Michael Hoffheimer, Monroe Freedman, Tim Hall, Ray Patterson,
and Tom Morgan, for their helpful comments on an early draft of this review.
I. David Luban is a Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, and
Professor of Law at the University of Maryland.
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Part I of the book presents Luban's challenge to the theoretical
structure in which the standard conception is embedded. This structure forms what Luban terms the "dominant picture" of legal ethics,
which consists of three elements: a theory of role morality akin to
F.H. Bradley's ethical system; the "adversary system excuse" for following role morality rather than "common" morality where the two
conflict; and the standard conception itself, which defines the lawyer's
role (pp. xix-xx). Luban's challenge is motivated by the (widely
shared) belief that the standard conception creates a professional role
whose duties are often intolerably far removed from those of common
morality. Luban's examples include these:
- a lawyer "bends her talents and ingenuity toward getting a
guilty, violent criminal back on the street" (p. xx);
- a lawyer assists "a man convicted of incest to regain custody of
his children" (p. xxii);
-Annesley v. Anglesey, 2 in which a lawyer privately prosecutes a
man at the bidding of a client, whose sole interest is that he stands to
gain financially by the man's conviction (pp. 3-9, 14-15, 49-52);
- Zabella v. Pakel 3 in which a lawyer enables a "wealthy man ...
to evade a five thousand dollar debt to an 'old friend, countryman and
former employee' by pleading the statute of limitations" (pp. 9-10, 4753, 82);
- a lawyer presents perjured testimony on behalf of a criminal
defendant and brutally discredits truthful opposing witnesses (p. xxi);
-The "Lake Pleasant Bodies Case,"4 in which lawyers acting on
their client's information locate and photograph the bodies of two
murder victims, but do not disclose this information until much later
(pp. 53-54, 149-53, 179, 185-86);
- Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 5 in which a lawyer defending a personal injury suit learns that the plaintiff has a life-threatening aneurysm, of which the plaintiff is unaware, and does not inform him (pp.
149-53, 179, 203).
In most of these examples, not only does the dominant picture put
the lawyer at odds with ordinary morality, it also makes the lawyer an
enemy of the law itself. Luban passionately, but cogently, rejects the
realist suggestion that zealous advocacy shows law all the respect it is
due (pp. 11-49), and cites the following as instances of lawyers working to frustrate the law by seeing to it that the party that legally should
prevail does not:
- lawyers for the D.C. Metro ar&uing that personal injury suits
2. Annesley v. Anglesey, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743).
3. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).
4. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), ajfd., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376
N.Y.S.2d 771, ajfd., 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976).
5. 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
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against the subway system could not proceed in a court created after
the Metro's chartering, and that filing there did not toll the statute of
limitations (pp. 13, 18, 49);
- lawyers challenging Immigration and Naturalization Service
detentions on the ground that the detention centers had been built
without necessary environmental approvals (pp. 13-14);
- forum-shopping (p. 14);
- taking inconsistent positions (pp. 14-15).
Luban diagnoses these symptoms as products of "instrumentalism
run amok" (p. 13) and traces this condition to the prevailing clientservice ethic of the profession, derived from the standard conception.
He argues that the standard conception and its client-centered ethic
ought to be replaced with an ethic of "moral activism" (pp. xxii, 16061). The morally activist lawyer shares responsibility for the aims of
the representation, challenges aims that are morally unworthy, and
cares about means beyond their mere legality. When in disagreement
with the client, Luban's lawyer "does not simply terminate the relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better" (p. 160), and
even may - from the client's viewpoint - betray the client.
Luban painstakingly exhibits the manner in which the standard
conception relies for its justification upon appeals to the adversary system and the roles it requires - this is the "adversary system excuse." 6
The adversary system excuse is but an instance of a general pattern of
justification for role-motivated departures from common morality,
which Luban somewhat infelicitously calls "the fourfold root of sufficient reason" (pp. xxii, 129-39). Within the "fourfold root" pattern,
the validity of an excuse is determined by how strongly the institution
appealed to is itself justified.
Before measuring the strength of the many justifications that have
been offered for the adversary system, Luban distinguishes between a
"civil paradigm" of adversary justice and a "criminal paradigm" (pp.
58-66). For reasons that I will explore in some detail, he concentrates
upon the possible justifications of the civil - rather than the criminal
- paradigm of adversary justice. After analyzing a range of defenses
of the morality of the (civil) adversary system - including consequentialist arguments as well as a "human dignity" argument advanced by
philosopher Alan Donagan7 - Luban concludes that it is at best
weakly justified. Therefore, he argues, the civil adversary system, as
an institution, cannot justify "any but the most insignificant deviations
from common morality" (pp. 67-93, 154). Luban concludes that the
6. Pp. xix-xx, 148-56. Luban's discussion here develops earlier thoughts that appeared in
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLE AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83 (D. Luban ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER].
7. Pp. 85-87 (citing Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 6, at 128-33).
-
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principle of nonaccountability is untenable in the civil arena, and that
the principle of partisanship is thus seriously constrained, "for accountable lawyers can optimize client outcomes only within the limits
of common moral obligations." 8
Thus, the principal result of the book's first part is a split-level
standard of zeal - old-fashioned, standard zeal for criminal defense
attorneys and attorneys for the little guy in "quasi-criminal" civil matters, and a "limited zeal" standard for lawyers for the state and for
powerful institutions. 9 But the overall argument itself depends upon
the claim that the standard role of criminal defense attorneys is justified in a fashion that is inapplicable to the adversary system generally.
To understand the structure of the argument, it is important to explore in detail Luban's reliance upon the distinction between civil and
criminal representation.
Luban's key claim is that while the "final cause" of the civil paradigm is "legal justice," that of the "criminal defense paradigm" is "not
legal justice but the protection of accused individuals against the state
or, more generally, the preservation of the proper relation between
powerful institutions and those over whom they are able to exercise
their power" (p. 66). Therefore - and this is a crucial tum in Luban's
overall argument - the evaluation of the adversary system as a system
ofjustice must be focused upon the civil paradigm to the exclusion of
the criminal paradigm, for it is only within the civil paradigm that the
adversary system functions primarily as a system of justice, i.e., 'as a
system primarily concerned with truth and desert. Luban distinguishes the "criminal" and "civil" paradigms this way:
The criminal defense paradigm includes any litigation context in which
zealous advocacy is justified by virtue of the fact that we have political
reasons to aim at prophylactic protection from the state, even at the expense of justice. In the same way we can speak of a "civil suit paradigm": this involves any litigation context in which, because we are
confronted with a dispute between relatively evenly matched parties, our
primary aim is legal justice, the assignment of rewards and remedies on
the basis of the parties' behavior as prescribed by legal norms. [p. 63]
8. P. 155. Luban embarks upon a "desperate and tedious safari,'' p. 145, to preserve a role
for "role" morality, see pp. 128-47, and he even embraces the preservation of a role for roles as a
criterion of his project's success, see p. 125; but in the end his view accords lawyers' role-bound
considerations a vanishingly small weight. Compare pp. 146-47 (roles generally create "new possibilities of human acknowledgment,'' so that role-directed conduct - despite its variance from
common moral demands - satisfies common morality's central demand that one act so as to
acknowledge the humanity of others) with pp. 154-55 (the merely pragmatic justification for civilparadigm adversary system means that "when [legal] professional and moral obligations conflict,
the moral obligation takes precedence").
9. Pp. 58-66, 156-58. A relaxed standard of zeal in civil litigation is similarly urged by Murray L. Schwartz. See Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J.
543, 553-54; see also Zimmerman, Professional Standards Versus Personal Ethics: The Lawyer's
Dilemma, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5.
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What supplies these "political reasons"? Luban identifies the source
as "classical liberalism":
a complex involving . . . the ideas that the state exists primarily to protect its citizens in the pursuit of their own goals and not to pursue goals
of its own; that individuals have rights, natural or otherwise, against the
state; and that the greatest danger to citizens is the state itself. [p. 63]
Luban adverts that the first of these ideas holds "little appeal" while
the second and third have been made plausible by "[t]he terrifying
advent of totalitarian regimes in our century" (p. 63). Luban finds the
political theory of classical liberalism "incomplete, if ... not actually
false," however, for "[i]t neglects the fact that the state is not the only
concentration of enormous power in modem society" (p. 63). To correct this deficiency, Luban recharacterizes the "criminal defense paradigm" as
any litigation context in which zealous advocacy on behalf of relatively
weak clients is justified by the fact that we have political reasons to aim
at prophylactic, or preemptive, overprotection of the individual from
powerful institutions (including the state, but also including private institutions), even at the expense of justice. [p. 65]
The "political reasons" underpinning the paradigm so redescribed are
characterized as drawn from a "progressive correction of classical liberalism" (p. 65).
At this point I will interpose some worries about Luban's procedure. His distinction of the two paradigms is overdrawn. It is an exaggeration to suggest that justice is an only tangential purpose of
criminal justice. It is of course true that criminal defendants enjoy
special constitutional protections; but the constitutional right to counsel does not obviously amount to an endorsement of the standard conception of defense counsel's role. 10 And, while it is true that legal
justice is a chief aim of the civil justice system, it is untrue to say that
that is its only aim, or that it does not serve other important values as
well. Civil suits avert civil warfare, and do a better job of that than of
bringing heavenly justice to earth. To serve this peacekeeping function, each litigant must feel that her side was heard and that her champion was able to fight as fiercely to achieve her vindication as she
would have fought herself, had she the training and inclination. If the
civil justice system as we find it is - to use Luban's phrase - prophylactically overprotective of each individual's rights against each other,
it is at least arguably justified in being so because of "political reasons" drawn from - where else? - classical liberalism.
10. In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court opined that the sixth amendment
right to "reasonably effective" assistance of counsel in a criminal defense is not automatically
violated by a breach of an ethical standard. See 475 U.S. at 165. The Court distanced itself from
approaches that would "narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct." 475
U.S. at 165; cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (criminal defendant assumed to have sixth
amendment right to counsel free of actual conflicts of interest).
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Luban's rendering of classical (and progressively corrected classical) liberalism is incomplete. In it, the Hobbesian war of all against all
is all but forgotten; but liberalism was born of suspicion of others and
only with the passage of time has come to be (mis)understood as solely
a doctrine of opposition to what Luban terms that "gaseous invertebrate," the state (pp. 31, 37). Liberals believe we have rights not only
against the state, but also against others, and not only against strong
others, but against all others. If - as Luban himself argues - there is
a conceptual barrier to the existence of duties toward gaseous invertebrates, then there is a conceptual barrier to the existence of rights
against them as well. Thus, a properly tended liberal ontology will
include rights against others, but no rights - except in a derivative
and eliminable sense - against the state and institutions.
A corrected understanding of the multiplicity of aims of the civil
justice paradigm, and of their roots in classical liberalism, undermines
Luban's overall argumentative strategy. The standard conception in
both criminal and civil paradigms could, on classical liberal principles,
be defended directly by appeal to "political reasons" rather than by
the exacting route of weighing up the pros and cons of the adversary
system, as the "fourfold root" would require. By invoking "political
reasons," Luban in effec~ allows the criminal adversary system to sidestep the "fourfold root" and cut ahead in line, but he does not show
why the civil paradigm does not deserve the benefit of these same
political reasons (even less does he ask whether they are ethically
sound).
For purposes of removing the moral excesses of the system, Luban
is aware that the standard conception could be trimmed all the way
around the edges rather than cut into the two pieces represented by
the split-level standard of limited civil zeal and fully zealous criminal
defense. But he evidently believes that the most plausible view will not
only be reformist but will also guarantee a "scorched earth defense"
(p. 203) to the accused criminal. Of course, if the "split-level" standard of zeal is confirmed by its applications, then the strategy of treating the criminal and civil paradigms differently with regard to their
respective justifications will seem more defensible. I will assess this
possibility below.
Although Luban does not put the criminal adversary paradigm to
the "fourfold root" test, he does provide a rigorous defense of one
aspect of the standard conception of criminal advocacy- the lawyer's
duty to preserve confidences. Part II of the book (pp. 177-234) is a
discussion of the duty and privilege of confidentiality, and here too
Luban advocates a split-level ethical standard. Rejecting the possibility of a utilitarian defense, 11 Luban argues that the evidentiary privilege for client confidences is, in the criminal defense context, justified
11. Pp. 189-92. Luban is persuaded that there is no good utilitarian answer to the
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by human dignity concerns. 12 Human dignity requires that the criminally accused enjoy a privilege against self-incrimination, for without
it the guilty would be cruelly tempted to commit perjury to escape
punishment. 13 Respect for the human dignity of the accused also requires a right to the effective assistance of counsel. And unless the
accused can confide in counsel without fear of unwanted disclosure,
she may be forced to trade away one right in order to exercise the
other. Therefore, a decent regard for human dignity requires that the
criminally accused be able to exercise the attorneyI client privilege.
The broader duty of confidentiality is justified, Luban argues, in order
further to encourage the client's communication with counsel and to
enable counsel to prepare, unhindered by any concern that what she
learns might be turned against her client (pp. 201-02).
Luban then turns to the question: Doesn't this or a similar rationale justify the duty of confidentiality within the civil paradigm? His
answer is no (pp. 202-04). He notes that there is discovery in civil
cases, in which each party may be required to testify under oath as to
all matters that might lead to evidence relevant to the dispute. In a
criminal case, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
bars the state from engaging in any discovery of the defendant. This
difference is not conclusive, as Luban points out, unless the moral
grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination do not justify a civil
counterpart (for which he suggests the term "privilege against selfimmolation" (p. 203)). Luban argues that they do not:
The difference is this: the purpose of a criminal conviction is to punish
wrongdoing, while the purpose of a civil action is to provide remedy [sic]
to a victim . . . . The existence of the injured party expands our concern
for human dignity from one person (the criminal defendant) to two (the
defendant and the aggrieved plaintiff). And it is absurd, I believe, to
argue that forcing the civil defendant to choose between lying and revealing facts that indicate that she indeed owes compensation affronts
her human dignity more than permitting her to preserve her honor by
eluding a just judgment affronts the human dignity of her victim. For
this is tantamount to saying that the victim's injury is less important
than the injurer's honor. Similarly, to force upon the plaintiff the choice
Benthamite argument that "[t]he privilege can do a guilty defendant no legitimate good, and
abolishing it can do an innocent defendant no illegitimate harm ...." P. 190.
12. Pp. 192-97. Luban's argument draws inspiration from M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4-5 (1975).
13. Luban elsewhere considers Donagan's argument that a concern for human dignity requires a presumption that the defendant has a good-faith defense, and that therefore an advocate
must be made available to the defendant to present that defense effectively. But, Luban claims,
this requirement would be satisfied by an inquisitorial system, and therefore Donagan's concerns
do not support the standard conception of the lawyer's role. Pp. 85-87, 193. A distinct concern
to avoid exposing the defendant to the cruel temptation to perjure herself is what, for Luban,
underlies the privilege against self-incrimination, and this concern evidently goes more deeply to
the core. Donagan, in fact, does not agree that human dignity concerns require the privilege
against self-incrimination, as Luban acknowledges. P. 195.
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between lying and admitting facts that would show no compensation is
owed her is scarcely the "form of torture more cruel than physical torture" that Memmius accused the oath de veritate dicenda of inflicting on
accused heretics.14

Luban falls here, I think, into several errors. I leave aside the oversimplification of assigning a single, punitive purpose to criminal justice
and a single, compensatory purpose to civil justice; but it is an egregious error to suggest that no victim exists in criminal cases. Typically, there is a victim. Therefore, the inquiry in both the civil and the
criminal case ought to be the same, whatever it is. If Luban has correctly identified the proper inquiry as that of deciding whose dignity
would suffer more, the wrongdoer's (should he be forced to testify) or
the victim's (should she unjustly fail to be vindicated), answering
seems to call for some sort of comparison of the dignitary losses
involved.
In a criminal case - say, a rape - the wrongdoer has a stake in
avoiding the dignitary injury that a "Memmian choice" would occasion.15 What the victim has at stake is her sense of personal worth, her
peace of mind, and, often, her reputation as well. I think it is false to
suggest - as Luban does - that "no one's life is made materially
worse off by an acquittal as such" (p. 59), unless the adverb is meant
quite literally. I think most of us would have to swallow very hard to
accept the suggestion implicit in Luban's analysis, that in upholding
the privilege against self-incrimination we are judging that the victim's
injury is less important than the rapist's honor.
The implication about balancing the dignitary injuries is one that
Luban has now disavowed. 16 But it would not do to leave the victim
out of it and rest upon the point that lying to avoid losing one's liberty
is more tempting - and thus occasions a deeper torment and a greater
dignitary affront to the accused - than lying to avoid losing money.
Elsewhere in the book Luban casts doubt on such a reading, as he also
14. Pp. 203-04. Luban continues: "In matters of distributive justice between private parties,
moreover, the Memmian dilemma does not signal the utter subordination of self to state: it
signals only the momentary 'subordination' of injurer to victim for purposes of making the victim
whole." P. 204. Luban skates here over a number of stubborn facts. The victim is the party that
typically is the first and least "momentarily" subordinated in civil discovery. Moreover, a civil
litigant's "subordination" occurs within a framework created and maintained by the state, and is
ultimately backed by the threat of state-enforced sanctions, which may include incarceration for
contempt. And so on. I think this passage illustrates Luban's tendency to engage in state-bash·
ing whenever the split-level standard runs into a jam. Casting the state as "the Great Satan," cf.
p. 225, is not an adequate substitute for argument.
15. Luban elsewhere suggests that rape cases belong in the civil suit paradigm. Seep. 151.
He argues that therefore a defense lawyer is constrained from using the full range of zealous
tactics to impeach the victim's testimony; but he does not go so far as to suggest that the rape
defendant ought not to enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney/client privilege. My example does not depend, I think, on the nature of the offense; aggravated assault of
one male upon another would present the same essential features.
16. Letter from David Luban to William A. Edmundson (Sept. 21, 1989) (on file with
author).
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undercuts the possibility of founding the civil/criminal distinction
upon the threat that criminal prosecution uniquely presents to physical liberty:
To be sure, physical liberty is of great importance to us; but so are other
things. We should not forget that the loss of physical liberty can be
slight as well as great; when it is slight, other things can outweigh it....
I would rather do thirty days in jail than be fined twenty thousand dollars .... Wouldn't you?17

Given this, Luban cannot maintain that the rapist's temptation to perjure himself at his criminal trial is inherently greater than that in the
battery suit he will have to defend later. Moreover, what can Luban
say to any civil litigant who stands to lose $20,000 and wants to have
the same zealous advocacy she could have in a criminal proceeding?
The nonexistence of a civil privilege against self-immolation, 18 and
the fact that few would be willing to plump for the creation of one,
does represent a sharp discontinuity between our relative levels of solicitude for those having reason to be anxious about criminal liability
and all others. Perhaps this discontinuity reveals deeper pressures
that, if identified, would make compelling the idea of a lesser duty of
confidentiality in civil cases. But there is no such sharp discontinuity
in our levels of concern in the Spaulding 19 (civil) and "Lake Pleasant
Bodies"20 (criminal) cases.
Endorsing the lawyers' failure to disclose the whereabouts of the
murder victims in the Lake Pleasant case is not made easier by the fact
the client faces prosecution - it is made easier by the fact that the
client has a lot to lose. Independently, the fact that the client's opponent is the state (rather than a private prosecutor, as in Annesley)21
seems to count for very little. The lawyer's nondisclosure in Spaulding
v. Zimmerman might be less troubling if it were a criminal negligence
prosecution;22 but not by much if in the civil version the client were
17. P. 262. Here, it is impossible not to be reminded of the well-traveled quip about the
number of zeros that need to be put to the left of the decimal to make an example compelling to a
legal audience.
18. "Nonsurvival" might be more apt. At common law, "a party could claim a privilege of
not being called to testify in behalf of an adversary (on the ground that it might be self-incriminatory or expose the witness to disgrace)." c. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.1.2, at 243
(1986) (emphasis added).
19. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962); see supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
20. People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975), affd., 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376
N.Y.S.2d 771, ajfd., 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867, 359 N.E.2d 377 (1976); see supra note 4
and accompanying text.
21. Craig v. Anglesey, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743); see supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
,
22. Of course, Spaulding presents a host of possible criminal law counterparts. Suppose, for
example, that jeopardy has attached, and that therefore nothing the lawyer discloses can affect
the client's criminal exposure. Or suppose that jeopardy has not attached, that the complainant's
discovery of the aneurysm would probably lead to the filing of more serious charges, and that the
aneurysm is unlikely to burst before jeopardy attaches, but is almost certain to burst when the
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without fault, uninsured, and exposed to the full extent of his assets.
And nondisclosure in the criminal version would not be any less
troubling if it were a prosecution for driving under the influence of
alcohol. Shifting from one field of law to another confronts us with an
altered array of consequences, but not a sharp discontinuity in our
responses. And our responses do not seem to register the relative
power of the players to anything like the degree we would expect if
civil and criminal paradigms mattered the way Luban would have
them.
Luban's discussion in Part II includes a more surefooted - and, I
think, devastating - critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Upjohn v. United States, 23 which upheld an evidentiary privilege for
corporate attorney-client confidences (pp. 220-33). In this Part,
Luban also advances a vigorous (if problematic) defense of the view
that the duty of confidentiality does not require criminal defense lawyers to conceal client perjury (pp. 197-201). Although this position is
widely held, it does not seem to square with Luban's earlier appeal to a
dimensionless "prophylactic overprotection" of the accused criminal
at the expense of truth.
Apart from the structural weaknesses in Luban's argument in
Parts I and II, there are difficulties inherent in the programmatic reforms he proposes. Luban argues that the current codes of legal ethics
have things reversed (pp. 159-60). Under current codes, the lawyer is
free to ignore the client's wishes with respect to tactical matters, but
must yield to the client's contrary wishes with respect to the client's
ultimate aims and means of achieving them, or resign if she can. 24
Luban argues that respect for the client's human dignity requires that
the client call the tactical shots, while the lawyer's accountability on
the moral activist model requires her to insist on her view of what the
client should want and how the client may get it.
Luban acknowledges that current professional standards, as comcomplainant undergoes the stress of trial (including the brutal cross-examination you have
planned). Or suppose the same facts, but that the aneurysm is likely to burst before jeopardy
attaches, that that in itself will cause manslaughter charges to be filed, but the client will not
consent to disclosure. In each of these instances one might inquire, in the manner of casebook
authors, what result?
23. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see also Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1982).
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OP
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 7-7, EC 7-8 (1980). As many commentators have noted, there are difficulties inherent in any attempt to divide the respective spheres of
client and lawyer control by appeal to dichotomies such as "tactics/ends" or "means/objectives." See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, § 4.3, at 156. "Reversing" spheres of authority so
questionably defined, as Luban does, is unlikely to be ultimately satisfactory. It is distressing
that, in practice, the degree of authority assumed by the lawyer seems inversely related to the
client's ability to pay. Compare J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982) with D. ROSENTHAL, ATTORNEY AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN
CHARGE? (1974).
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monly interpreted, permit a lawyer to seek to withdraw from a morally repugnant representation even at a cost to the client.25 Luban
takes this as exhibiting the current professional standards' endorsement of the standard conception. But it is unclear what alternative
(besides acquiescence and withdrawal) a move to the moral activist
ethic would open. Luban floats the suggestion that "the rules be redrafted to allow lawyers to forgo immoral tactics or the pursuit of
unjust ends without withdrawing, even if their clients insist that they
use these tactics or pursue these ends" (p. 159; emphasis added). It is
difficult to envisage how a lawyer might convey such a decision to the
client (as surely she must) other than in terms that would naturally be
understood either as a threat to withdraw or as a threat to act - as
the client's attorney - in a manner contrary to the client's announced
wishes. The former sort of threat is already allowed under current
professional standards. The latter is apt to seem presumptuous (and
even preposterous) unless the lawyer can support it by appeal to some
law or mandatory ethical standard. Luban expressly declines to decide whether to endorse a mandatory or an aspirational standard of
forgoing immoral tactics (and, presumably, of eschewing immoral
ends), and therefore the reform proposal he does offer seems shapeless
(see p. 158).
The other end of Luban's proposed reversal is problematic as well.
Because the question whether to forgo "nonfrivolous [but moral] legal
positions" is, for Luban, a tactical one; it is one that the client must
make (p. 160). Presumably, it is the lawyer's duty to inform the client
that such positions exist, for this is surely entailed, on Luban's view,
by the necessity of respecting the client's human dignity. It is not
clear, however, how this transfer of tactical authority to the client
could fail to hinder the efficiency of the justice system and to curtail
the lawyer's capacity to negotiate, mediate, and compromise - to say
nothing of the impact such a transfer would have upon the quality of
professional existence. 2 6
Another weakness in Luban's generally astute discussion pertains
to the issue of the moral complications of representing unworthy clients in order to vindicate not the client's interests but an abstract principle. The ACLU's advocacy of the Nazis' right to demonstrate in
predominantly Jewish Skokie, Illinois, is defended by Luban by appealing to the doctrine of "double effect" - according to which "it is
25. See pp. 396-97 & n.2; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.16(b) (1983);
MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2), DR 7-10l(A)(3) (1980).
26. Luban elsewhere notes a corporate lawyer's description of his work as "picking fly shit
out of the pepper." P. 401. Each movement of the tweezers arguably would represent a tactical
decision to pursue or forgo a nonfrivolous legal position ("this is relevant, this is privileged, this
is work product, this is outside the scope of their request," etc.). Those who have actually done
this sort of thing will appreciate how irksome it would be truly to involve an unsophisticated
client in each of these decisions.
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permissible to perform an act likely to have evil indirect consequences
... only if its direct effect ... is morally acceptable and the intention
of the actor aims only at the acceptable effect, the evil effect not being
one of her ends" (p. 162). Luban suggests that the doctrine "fits" the
ACLU position and "more generally, any lawyer who represents scum
to vindicate principles" (p. 162). So long as we can "hang onto" the
doctrine, Luban says, the ACLU lawyer can be defended without appeal to the principle of nonaccountability, and thus without undercutting the attack on the standard conception.27
But presumably the "double effect" excuse is not one that Luban
wants to be made generally available, for it would excuse much of the
lawyerly conduct that he wants to condemn. Lord Anglesey's lawyer
does not seek James Annesley's destruction; he rather seeks, by forestalling Annesley's claim, to protect his client's property - so described, a morally acceptable end and one more directly furthered
than that of Annesley's destruction. Although certainly Luban would
object to such an application of the doctrine of double effect, it is unclear how he can consistently do so while relying upon the "double
effect" doctrine to reconcile the moral accountability of criminal defense lawyers with their violation of the common moral duty not to
"get[] a guilty, violent criminal back out on the street."28
A final source of unease with Parts I and II of the book has to do
with the treatment of examples. Those intended to illustrate lawyers
at odds with common morality happen preponderantly to be drawn
from the criminal defense paradigm, and under general application of
Luban's split-level approach the common moral obligation involved
would still be ignored. Because of the state's special role as protector
of the young, Luban presumably would place the child-custody case in
the civil rather than the quasi-criminal paradigm, and therefore the
lawyer may not zealously advocate the incestuous parent's cause (p.
65). This, and Luban's suggestion that rape cases belong in the civil
paradigm,29 indicates that the civil/criminal/quasi-criminal framework is not self-defining. Although the framework is not so devoid of
content as to be totally ad hoc, there are indications aplenty that it is
no substitute for analysis. William Simon proposes an approach that
would have the lawyer measure her ethical responses to the likelihood
that other actors in the legal system will correct wrongs that her zeal27. P. 162. Luban's image of "hanging on to" the doctrine of double effect is apt. Philippa
Foot has cogently argued that the examples from which the doctrine draws what plausibility it
has can be handled as well - or better - by distinguishing positive duties (to render aid) from
negative duties (to avoid harming). See P. FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of
Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES 19-32 (1978).
28. P. xx. Luban concedes that even in the criminal paradigm the principle of nonaccountability "holds only approximately" because "powerful countervailing reasons will apply in
some instances." P. 156 n.6. What these reasons are and when and how they might prevail is
not even suggested.
29. See supra note 15.
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ous conduct might cause. 30 Such an approach dispenses altogether
with Luban's categories, and has much to recommend it.
In the clearly civil instances, the lawyer's conduct on the moral
activist model would be tempered, but Luban seems insufficiently concerned with showing that common morality would in fact be violated
by what the standard conception would have the lawyer do. In the
Zabel/a 31 case, for example, it is not obvious that a moral obligation to
repay a monetary debt does not tend to decay with the "mere efllux of
time" (p. 10) - for time never merely passes: expectations change,
debtors come to rely on their creditors' forbearance, and so forth.
Common morality is not as monolithic or as straightforward as Luban
frequently suggests; nor does it exist in airtight isolation from law. 32
Especially where what morality requires is unclear, law's alembic frequently serves to distill its content. Therefore, some care needs to be
taken to distinguish our unhappiness with the ethics of laws from our
unhappiness with the ethics of lawyers.
Also troubling is the fact that none of Luban's abstract discussion
furthers an understanding of some of the "lawyers against the law"
examples. Luban never explains why forum-shopping and taking inconsistent positions are inherently disrespectful of the law. And
Luban never explains how a professional duty to follow the spirit of
the law can stand, without poljcing, as a more effective curb against
lawyerly disrespect for law than the "good faith" requirement embodied in current professional standards. 33
Part III of the book (pp. 237-89) is devoted to establishing that the
30. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 (1988). I should note
that Simon bites off considerably Jess than Luban, and that may be why he is able to chew
without categorial assistance. Simon, for example, applies his analysis only to civil practice;
although he suggests that it "has relevance" to criminal practice, its defense requires "qualifications and elaborations" that he has not yet put into print. See id. at 1084. Moreover, Simon's
analysis does not apply to conflicts between "legal and nonlegal moral commitments." Id. at
1114. A commitment is "legal" for Simon if it is "grounded in important legal values." Id.
Although this is not clear from Simon's discussion, presumably his approach has no application
to Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962), for in the absence of consent, or some special relationship, a positive duty to render aid does not appear to be grounded in
any important legal value. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). Therefore, the defense lawyer's dilemma in Spaulding is presumably defined by his legal commitment
to keep the confidence and a merely moral commitment to render aid, and is a dilemma Simon's
analysis is not intended to cover.
31. Zabella v. Pake!, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957); see supra text accompanying note 3.
32. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has pointed out that "law, rather than a mere technical
add-on to a morally (or immorally) finished society, is, along of course with a whole range of
other cultural realities from the symbolics of faith to the means of production, an active part of
it." C. GEERTZ, LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
218 (1983). For another view of what Geertz might call the "imminglement" oflaw and morality, see Edmundson, Are Law and Morality Distinct?, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 33 (1990).
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7102(A)(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983). Luban offers a
spirited argument designed to show that a "good faith" standard is ineffectual in a world ruled by
the standard conception. Pp. 16-17.
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poor have a right to at least minimally competent legal assistance in
civil as well as criminal matters. Luban argues that a right to civil
counsel is implicit in the principles that legitimate our form of government, and in doing so paradoxically argues that the Supreme Court, in
refusing to extend the Gideon v. Wainwright 34 line of cases to civil
matters, has overvalued the civil/criminal distinction (pp. 261-62). He
advocates the deregulation of routine legal services and a mandatory
pro bono requirement to guarantee the remainder. Although his discussion of deregulation seems insensitive to some of the difficulties of
isolating what legal services are truly routine, empirical patterns of
lawyer-to-layperson delegation are sufficient to show that the profession itself has reached a tacit consensus that certain legal services particularly in the real estate area - fall on the routine side of the
line, however it is drawn.
In what I think is the most powerful section of the book, Luban
defends the concept of mandatory pro bono against a range of popular
but specious objections (pp. 277-89). Luban's discussion on this point
should be required reading for everyone seriously interested in the profession. In Part IV (pp. 293-391), he ably defends the concept of statefunded morally activist representation against charges that it is antidemocratic and a betrayal of the poor. My suspicion, though, is that
decently funded, politically unhamstrung legal services programs will
be a long time coming (back). 35 Mandatory pro bono and limited deregulation, on the other hand, are ideas whose time is already arriving. 36 As these ideas are implemented they may at least help to fill
ordinary peoples' legal needs, which go unmet in staggering numbers. 37 The legal profession's indifference to these needs, much more
34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35. See Under Bush, a Band ofReaganites Continues Fight to Slash Funds for Legal Aid to the
Poor, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1989, at Al8, col. l; Lewis, Legal Services: Political Test Looms/or
Bush, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at BS, col. 3; Internecine Battles at the Legal Services Corp.
Continue Unabated, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1989, at B4, col. 6; Lewis, Bush Replaces Leadership of
Legal Services/or Poor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at Al4, col. 1.
36. See e.g., At Issue.· Mandatory Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 52; Margolick, Panel
UrgesLawyersBeRequiredto Work20Hoursa Year for Poor, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1989,atAl,
col. l; Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, Natl. L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
Luban's proposal for mandatory pro bono includes a "buy out" option, see pp. 279-80, which
would not only be economically desirable - since the price many lawyers are willing to pay to be
excused from an hour of pro bono exceeds the value they could deliver in that hour - it would
also make the plan politically more feasible.
37. Luban calculates that more than 20 million hours of necessary legal services are not
provided to the poor in the United States annually. P. 241. Even in the supposedly big-expo·
sure/deep-pocket area of medical malpractice, one ABA committee's study found that only
about one of every six instances of malpractice gives rise to a claim, much less a recovery. See
also Malpractice Study Finds 7.000 Died in New York in 1984 Due to Negligence, Wall St. J., Mar.
1, 1990, at B4, col. 6 ("Only 2% of the patients that suffered a negligent injury actually filed a
claim .... ") Contrary to the popular myth that ours is an excessively litigious society, Ameri·
cans are "slow to perceive injury . . . reluctant to make claims . . . and . • . fearful of • • •
litigating." Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming ..• , 15 LAW. & Socv. REv. 631, 652 (1981); see also Galanter, Reading the
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than its excesses of zeal in pursuing the interests it does serve, seems to
me to epitomize the failure of lawyers to do justice.
The virtue of mandatory pro bono lies not exclusively, or perhaps
even primarily, in its direct distributive consequences. As has been
pointed out, a powerful determinant of a lawyer's social attitudes is
the nature of the interests she represents. 38 To the extent that
mandatory pro bono will compel lawyers to identify themselves with
interests unlike their own and unlike those they typically represent, it
will have the salutary effect of enabling them to regain something of
the detachment and evenhandedness that were once thought specially
to qualify lawyers to guide public policy. 3 9
As Luban points out, the massive concentrations of private wealth
in America operate to defeat popularly desired distributive reforms
(pp. 358-68). This reality is a complete answer to any suggestion that
our concerns about justice in the distribution of legal services should
be confined to taxing and spending legislation. Still, it is not evident,
at first blush anyway, why reform is likely to fare any better in the
ABA and the state bar associations than in the legislatures. One reason to think that the profession may be better able to advance redistributive reform is that the bar has for so long and so insistently
espoused an ideal of public service, that mere consistency requires it to
addre&s a condition it so deplores and is best able to correct.40 Also, so
long as the maldistribution of legal services remains unaddressed, the
autonomy of the profession (a matter of some concern to the organized
bar) will to that extent be less secure. As to the question, "Why, and
at what level, should the bar rather than the public at large fund costly
redistributive measures?," one answer is that the monopoly rents the
bar commands supply both a justification and a measure of what the
Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983). To paraphrase a welfarerights lawyer Luban cites, the poor are "constantly bumping into sharp legal things" and not
complaining- at least not to anyone prepared to represent them. P.241 (citing Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 19 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1970)).
38. See Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers from Their Profession: Rede.fining the Lawyer's
Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32-34 (1980); see generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957).
39. See L. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 313 (1913);
Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 52
(G. Gawalt ed. 1984); Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large
Law Firms, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 95, 118.

40. See, e.g., AssN. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK SPECIAL COMM. ON THE
LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS, TOWARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC
SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER (1979); cf. Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, i216 (1958); Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TExAs L. REV. 689, 697-701 (1981) (pointing out the
ABA's "narcissistic concern" with promoting an image of public-spiritedness, and recounting the
demise of the Kutak Commission's mandatory pro bono proposal).
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bar should be expected to contribute.41
Philip B. Heymann's and Lance Liebman's The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers 42 is as important a pedagogic contribution as Lawyers
and Justice is a theoretical one. The authors have collected and
loosely organized thirteen "case studies," which are self-consciously
modeled upon materials used in schools of business and of public policy. The studies are intended to describe "events, institutions, choices,
and outcomes" (p. xxi) with a richness of detail that stands in contrast
to the skeletal and tendentious narration that typifies appellate opinions, whose further skeletalized edited versions form the stuff of the
standard law school casebook. The authors suggest that viewing the
issues of professional responsibility through the prism of appellate decisions obscures "what ... lawyers do, and how ... the profession [is]
structured" and unduly highlights "'the law': rules, doctrines, policies'~ (p. xxi). The book is an effort to present the legal, social, and
ethical issues that confront lawyers in a "credible context," and to
avoid circumscribing that context in any way that might make ethical
problems seem merely individual and occasional rather than as they
are, common and systemic.
The stories (this is as good a name as any for the narrative portions
of the studies) average just under twenty pages in length, and so are
much longer than the problems and hypotheticals found in most
teaching materials. 43 The stories focus on individual lawyers who, collectively, well represent the vast diversity of the bar: legal services
attorneys, public defenders, plaintiffs' workers' compensation lawyers,
storefront legal clinicians, prosecutors, corporate lawyers, corporate
41. Deborah Rhode has decried the "vacuous ring" of redistributivist rhetoric. See Rhode,
The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Mo. L. REv. 274, 281-83 (1986). Any "meaningful
effort to equalize access" would, given (among other things) the "elasticity of legal needs," require "massive public subsidies [and] the prohibition of private markets." Id. at 282. Moreover,
"[m]ore modest calls to enhance, if not fully equalize, access still leave all the sticky points
unaddressed." Id. Rhode's first (extreme) alternative is not so very different from the manner in
which we pursue the ideal of equal political access: we massively subsidize government services
and prohibit a market in votes. As to Rhode's point about the more modest calls, the sticky
points no doubt have to be addressed, but there is no reason to think they are unaddressable.
Rhode elsewhere has argued that a 40-hour-per-year mandatory pro bone requirement would not
"materially affect a problem of such [perceived] dimensions." See Rhode, supra note 41, at 701.
I think Rhode is too despairing. Three million, two hundred thousand hours of legal work per
annum (40 hours times 800,000 lawyers) is better than the proverbial poke in the eye with a
sharp stick; and these hours may have an impact far beyond what their numbers suggest if they
are spent, as Luban urges (pp. 341-57), seeking class-wide remedies to the most urgent problems
of the underrepresented.
42. The authors are professors at Harvard Law School.
43. Other authors have tried to include more extensive fact patterns than those typically
excerpted from appellate opinions, but none have approached Heymann and Leibman in the
degree of prolixity. Cf s. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND ETHICS 356·60, 584-88, 613-15, 665-69, 728-32, 828-35 (2d ed. 1989) (seven "simulated case histories,'' averaging about four pages each); N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH (2d ed. 1983) (17 problems, using narratives that average three
pages).
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litigators, mergers and acquisitions specialists, legislators, lobbyists for
the personal injury bar, associates, elder statespersons, and so forth.
Their educational backgrounds are stereotypically outstanding Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Georgetown - except where "credible context" demands otherwise: e.g., a legal clinic associate is identified as a
graduate of "!Iliana Law School" (p. 58). In the course of their stories, some of these lawyers serve a single client, or none at all; others
deal with dozens or scores. In almost all of the stories, the lawyers are
presented as dealing not with a single decision but with a network of
decisions, and not as deciding in isolation, but in conjunction with
clients, colleagues, supervisors, associates, professional acquaintances,
and friends. Judges rarely appear, and when they do their role is the
'perfunctory one of ratifying bargains struck elsewhere.
Preserving "credible context" sometimes involves an eclecticism
worthy of a bowerbird. In addition to narrative and - occasionally
- excerpted statutes and ABA rules, many of the studies include such
things as casts of characters, chronologies, historical sketches, appendices, lists, breakdowns, statistics, tables, memoranda, drafts, and
charts. The reader is drawn - much as the lawyer would be - into
complex micro-worlds, and in the process learns a good deal about
such things as caffeine, asbestos, and "blue sky" securities laws. The
stories themselves elide nothing. Names forgettable - Jason Smith,
Martha Solinger, Rosemary Pryor - brush against names well-known
- Cesar Chavez, Joseph Flom, Gary Hart. In one of the cases, a
certain Trevor King is introduced (p. 241). An accountant, his sole
performance is to instruct that an audit be done and to report its results to higher-ups. Such devices may sound annoying, as occasionally
they are, but they are also surprisingly effective in conveying something of the flavor of practice; and, particularly in the first-person narratives, they make the stories more compelling reading.
The stories have various sources. Some are based upon events reported in appellate opinions; others give us a fuller account of events
that were contemporaneously publicized - the volte-face of the Justice Department in the Bob Jones University 44 case (pp. 136-82); the
battle to acquire Conoco (pp. 106-35); the OPM Leasing Services scandal (pp. 184-215); the defeat of the Hart-Magnuson federal "no-fault"
automobile insurance bill (pp. 309-35). Other stories are based upon
events that would be anonymous even apart from the authors' use of
fictitious names: "Gladys' " struggle for custody of her granddaughter, "Rita" (pp. 2-20); "David Keith's" defense against murder
charges (pp. 69-105); an unnamed woman's settlement of her workers'
compensation claim (pp. 258-94). Research and drafts of the stories
were done by a squad of student research assistants. One of the stories
44. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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is, in fact, a business school case study. 45
As a concession to the traditional casebook format, each study is
followed (one is interrupted) by rhetorical questions and a modicum of
discussion. Often the questions and discussion identify issues pertaining to the Code and Model Rules, but not all of the technical issues
present in the cases are identified. The first story, for example, "Rita's
Case," so involves Gladys' lawyer with the everyday lives of Gladys
and Rita that she becomes privy to unprivileged knowledge unhelpful
to Gladys. The authors' discussion questions the propriety of her involvement, but it does not flag the potential applicability of the "lawyer/witness" rule.46
Another example: in "Food for Thought" (pp. 216-34), an associate drafts a memorandum for a client whose powdered chocolate milk
mix contains an ingredient, caffeine, that is not listed on its label. She
concludes that the omission is a violation of law but, at the end of a
meeting with her supervising partner and the client corporation's president, she is directed to produce an opinion letter taking the opposite
position. After the meeting breaks up the lawyer leaves the office to
keep a lunch date with a friend, who she hopes can help her sort
through her dilemma. The discussion and questions following the
story raise a number of issues, including whether the lawyer may or
must go to the Food and Drug Administration to blow the whistle on
the client - but they do not raise the issue of the lawyer's duty or
permission to approach the client's board of directors, 47 nor do they
question the propriety of her seeking her friend's guidance. 48
These oversights (if that is what they are) may in fact be pedagogically useful. First, they are an almost unavoidable product of the
wealth of detail and ambiguous shading that the authors have tried to
build into the stories. Second, the latency of so many issues conveys
(whether or not by indirection) the fact that practice is saturated with
ethical significance at every level of choice - whether the decision is
as momentous as choosing, say, between working for a blue-chip firm
and working for the Environmental Protection Agency, or as mundane as choosing what social distance (if any) to keep between oneself
and a client.
Many of the discussions - for example, that of the OPM Leasing
story (pp. 184-97)- focus with considerable penetration upon technical issues of how to apply the Code or Model Rules. The studies also
45. Pp. 49-68 ("The Law Offices of Lewin and Associates").
46. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 5-lOl(B), 5-102 (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983).
47. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.13 (b) (1983).
48. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983).
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raise a fair cross-section of the standard "hard" questions: impeaching
the truthful witness, telling the client how likely arguably illegal future
conduct is to be detected, and so on. One of the chief virtues of both
the stories and the discussions, however, is that the authors have kept
their aim upon the issues of how best to lead one's life, how best to
serve others (including one's clients), and how best to serve justice,
rather than upon the often merely prudential, technical questions of
how to avoid discipline and liability. In the discussion of "Rita's
Case" the authors brilliantly pose and explore the issues of client autonomy, and of the propriety of zealous devotion to the client's interests where a genuine adversarial contest is not to occur (see pp. 2-20).
Allotting equal time in the discussion to every conceivable technical
issue would, I think, have conveyed the message that no distinction
need be made between large and small considerations. Ethical concern is like every other resource, scarce; and so to the extent that one
is trained to attend to technical propriety, one is trained to ignore
larger questions.
Many of the stories end with an epilogue following the discussion
questions. The epilogues typically add yet another level of ambiguity
- even irony - to what has come before. Admirably, none of the
epilogues provide any sort of resolution or Aristotelian unity. Gladys
gets custody of Rita, who continues to have difficulties; Gladys' lawyer
loses contact with them. Further epidemiological studies make the
hazards of caffeine less certain, which affects in subtle ways the legality of failing to list it as an ingredient. The "once-in-a-lifetime" thrill
of thwarting Seagram's bid for Conoco settles into memory as Conoco
is swallowed by DuPont. Life goes on; and the crisp, zero-sum denouement that appellate decisions lead us to expect simply never
comes.
While Luban typifies the quest for a meta-principle to palliate the
excesses of adversary ethics, Heymann and Liebman suggest a more
nominalistic approach to the entire subject, an approach that has affinities to recent trends in philosophy and legal scholarship. It has become almost a commonplace to observe that ethics arise in and draw
substance from some shared form of life, some community of purpose
and meaning, some group ethos, tradition, or Lebenswelt - and not
from mere nature, or from reason itself, or from any supernatural stipulation. 49 Philosopher Bernard Williams, for example, has argued
that ethical knowledge can exist only within a matrix of "thick description," by which he means an evaluative discourse that partakes of
the richness and particularity of routine factual description. 50 Thick
49. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY (1977); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER
J. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).
50. See B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 128-30, 142-50, 167-73
(1985).

VIRTUE (1981);
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description employs "thick concepts," such as coward, lie, brutality,
and gratitude. Such concepts are "world-guided," in that they possess
an ineliminable descriptive content, and are at the same time inherently "action guiding," in that their application supplies reasons for
action.
Ethical knowledge, Williams argues, is born of particularity and
dies of abstraction. We are drawn to abstraction because of our desire
to make one thing of many, and to make what is local universal. But
in abstracting we tear ethics loose from the only soil in which it can
grow. Williams concludes that ethical knowledge is lost if reflection
upon cross-cultural differences draws local discourse into a universalistic ethical vocabulary. 51 If Williams is right, then Luban's project, of
reconciling distinctively professional "trade idioms" (pp. 4, 104) with
a presumably universalistic "commonsense" morality, must fail. 52 But
even if this project fails, the trade idioms of the law may very well
support ethical knowledge. If the trade idioms of legal practice possess the descriptive richness of thick concepts, then legal ethical
knowledge is possible - perhaps even codifiable.
Whether or not this is right, it suggests precisely the approach
Heymann, Liebman, and associates have taken. The stories show us
the soil, and they illustrate how ethical worries typically enter consciousness not via "rules, doctrines, policies" but because something
"out there" in the world strikes us as fishy, out-of-whack, or because
we catch ourselves rationalizing a choice a second or third time. In
the Conoco takeover story, a first-year associate finds a legal theory to
delay the advances of a hostile "suitor." "It was sort of a bizarre
claim ... ," she muses after the fact (p. 112). As to another, similarly
tenuous claim, she feels "vindicated about it everyday," because the
suitor later went broke (p. 113). The capacity to respond in this way
to a situation - apart from any aptitude for "issue spotting'' or rulemongering - is the equipment by which much of ethical life is led.
But ethical knowledge requires more than happy intuition. On
Williams' view, meaningful legal ethical discourse presupposes a
quasi-descriptive vocabulary: e.g., this tactic was "lawyerly," this con51. According to Williams, if one prizes knowledge but has no confidence in reflection as a
means to it, "the idea that reflection can destroy knowledge will tum against reflection and
express itself in the kind of conservatism, or worse, that praises rootedness, unspoken grasp, and
traditional understandings." Id. at 168. Williams adds that "(t]here is certainly more to be said
for these things than much progressive thought has allowed ...•" Id. For an encomium to
"unspoken grasp," see Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
52. In Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 6, at 259, Williams warns against casting the divergence of professional and common morality as a matter of casuistical, rather than dispositional, conflict. Id. at 263. From the latter
perspective, the important problem is one of avoiding "a mystifying conception of the dignity of
the profession," id. at 266, which Williams suggests is to be solved by cultivating professional
dispositions that incorporate a psychologically sustainable degree of reflectiveness. Williams had
no occasion, in this essay, to address the issue of what might be an epistemologically sustainable
degree of professional reflectiveness.
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tact was "unprofessional," that disclosure was "unethical." Yet the
Heymann and Liebman book unsettles any such presupposition. In
story after story, conduct that is permissible (if at all) only at the margins of the professional role as defined by the Code and Rules, is represented as an integral and even central part of lawyers' work. The
public defender: "To represent a client properly, you have to be able
to develop an enormous amount of empathy . . . . If the jury se:qses
that you· do not like your client, that you just do not care if he goes
down the drain, sure as anything they will flush him." 53 Litigators for
Conoco: "People who run companies [facing hostile takeover bids]
will pay anything to anyone who can give them hope .... [A]nything
with even the most remote chance of success is done . . . . [It] is not a
game of high percentage arguments . . . . You can't bring frivolous
lawsuits, but .... " 54 Dissonance abounds: a plaintiffs' workers' compensation lawyer deplores lawyer advertising, but spends tens of
thousands of dollars for it annually: "[I]f they are going to allow it,
then I'm going to do more than anybody else. But I think it is terrible
to have" (p. 270).
The restoration of "credible context" facilitates the study of legal
ethics from other perspectives. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has insisted that an understanding of legal practices is possible only to the
extent that we resist the urge to "draw pure structure from its culturespecific accretions." 55 This perspective calls into question the assumption of homogenized membership, which has been thought to be a defining feature of the professions. 56 Although the passing of what may
have once been a more nearly homogenous and monolithic bar has
been widely noted, 57 this is a fact that legal education is supposed to
mitigate, and for that reason, tends to deny.
The chief virtue of the Heymann and Liebman book is that it provides credible descriptions of the various cultures that make up the
American legal profession. Here, in the story of the lobbying of Congress during long-running debates over federal no-fault automobile in53. P. 79; cf MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-17, 7-24, DR 7106(C)(4) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(e) (1983); Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1983) (holding that a criminal defendant has no sixth amendment
right to a lawyer with whom she has good rapport).
54. Pp. 112, 122; cf FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY
DR 7-102(A)(l),(2) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rules 3.1, 3.4, 4.4
(1983).
55. c. GEERTZ, supra note 32, at 182 (quoting M. BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS 33
(1968)).
56. See E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 3-13 (1957); M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM 12-15 (1977).
57. See Berle, Legal Professi'on and Legal Education, in 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 340-45 (E. Seligman & A. Johnson eds. 1933). The rapidly growing heterogeneity of
the rapidly growing bar is a recurring theme of Richard Abel's recent study, R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989).
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surance legislation, we find the very survival of one settled faction of
the bar threatened by the activity of others. 58 The stories also illustrate how lawyers' roles overlap with nonlawyer roles: social worker,
business person, psychologist, friend, comrade, lobbyist, and so on.
This, and the diversity of roles within the profession, raise the question
whether the effort to impose a univocal and usefully determinate
"ethic" on the nearly 800,000 lawyers in the United States (double the
number in 1970) can proceed from any assumed underlying trade idiom. Cumulatively, the stories suggest that Williams' "thick descriptions" are absent, and that the pursuit of a unique and universal
professional ethic presents a task of "compass[ing] dissensus," 59 in
Geertz' phrase - rather than of distilling an essence.
There has been a "call to context" in recent American legal scholarship60 and, in consequence, "[e]veryone has been writing stories
these days." 61 Recent writing on the narrative dimension of law has
emphasized the possibilities of storytelling to.advance "outsider jurisprudence."62 These accounts tend to assume that because lawyers occupy a privileged relationship to law, lawyers' stories are reflected in,
and dominate, the law itself. 63 But, as the stories collected by Heymann and Liebman show, legal materials - opinions, casebooks, and
so forth - do a very poor job of presenting the stories that lawyers
have to tell. The lawyer's voice is one among "the multiplicity of
voices that the law generally quiets." 64 The prime reason for this is
that lawyers present themselves as tellers not of their own stories, but
of stories composed to further what is thought to be the best outcome
for their clients. Some of the best stories in this collection are those
58. Pp. 317-20, 326. A similar point can be drawn from Luban's account of"A Shoot-out in
the ABA" (pp. 180-85) over the Kutak Commission's proposed confidentiality rule. The most
conspicuous faction in both struggles was the trial lawyers. See also R. ABEL, supra note 57, at
11 (noting the growth of "unofficial professional associations divided by race, gender, religion,
age, politics, clientele, function, and role"). There is no peace even within specialties not divided
along plaintiffs' bar/defense bar lines. See, e.g., Matrimonial Lawyers Trade Barbs at Annual
Convention in Chicago, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1989, at BS, col. 1.
59. C. GEERTZ, supra note 32, at 219. It is no coincidence that "the soul-searching visible in
the constant writing and rewriting of ethical rules" comes at a time when "[t]he increasing heterogeneity of the profession and differentiation of the roles lawyers perform and the structures
within which they practice have greatly complicated their efforts to engage in collective action."
R. ABEL, supra note 57, at 5, 13. Williams suggests that following special rules is a worthwhile
professional disposition, so long as the rules "are acknowledged to be conventions that can be
changed by agreement." Williams, supra note 52, at 267.
60. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?,
87 MICH L. REv. 2099, 2099 (1989). See generally Legal Storytelling Symposium, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2073 (1989).
61. Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2411, 2411 (1989).
62. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech.• Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320, 2323-26 (1989).
63. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2083-84 (1989)
64. Id. at 2084.

May 1990]

Lawyers' Justice

1855

that are told in the first person - particularly Randy Bellows' account
of life as a public defender (pp. 69-105) - or are suffused with the
personality of an individual lawyer - such as the account of Raul
Lovett, the kitsch-encrusted, Mickey Mouse-loving plaintiffs' workers'
compensation lawyer in Providence, Rhode Island (pp. 258-94).
Narrative "may evoke our empathic distress response more readily
than abstract theory." 65 And while questions of entitlement cannot be
decided on the basis of empathy alone, the personal decision - what
sort of life shall I lead - is not simply a matter of deciding what sort
of life has the strongest claim to be led; therefore, imaginatively gauging one's "empathic distress response" to a legal practice or lifestyle
may indeed be the best single - if not the only - basis upon which to
make such a choice. The Heymann and Liebman book may be most
useful to those trying to decide whether to pursue a legal career or
where within the variegated profession to try to fit themselves. The
stories faithfully convey, without bathos, many of the stresses inherent
in lawyers' roles. The unrelenting challenge of making a practice succeed as a business is squarely conveyed in "The Law Offices of Lewin
& Associates" - the one true B-school study (pp. 49-68). The uneven
course of what Luban would call "political love" between California
Rural Legal Assistance lawyers and their Chicano clients is the main
theme of the story that recounts a battle in the legal war for migrant
farmworker rights. Randy Bellows' story of his defense of a confessed
serial murderer begins: "This is the story of David Keith and a marriage that was almost broken" (p. 69). Although the marriage he
speaks of is, of course, his own, it somehow seems less vivid to the
teller than the career that threatens it - which (perhaps inadvertently) reveals the root of the problem.
Bellows' and other stories portray how lawyers often must learn to
manage a gnawing sense of living in bad faith; Bellows, for example,
tries "not to think about victims too much . . . . It makes a difficult job
nearly impossible. . . . Occasionally . . . it does become impossible.... " (p. 79-80). He then recounts a case he pulled out of "[a]t the
first opportunity" (p. 80). Without romanticizing either, the stories
convey a sense of the rewards of practice as well as its burd,eqs. The
happiest lawyers are those like Raul Lovett, who can choose and have
chosen a style of practice that is close to their principles and personalities. The lawyers who seem least at ease are those who sense that their
professional roles leave something out of account, whether at the level
of principle, personal bent, or both. Small concessions to individuality
sometimes have to stretch a long way: the first-year associate caught
up in the Conoco takeover fight works until midnight over the Fourth
of July weekend, but "g[ets] to wear jeans" while doing so (p. 120).
Although the virtue of the book lies, in a sense, in its excesses, not
65. Massaro, supra note 60, at 2105.
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all of its excesses are to the purpose. The OPM Leasing scandal story
(pp. 184-97) is repeatedly interrupted by discussion questions. The
questions are just fine as far as they go, but their interjection needlessly
takes away from the reader the edifying task of discerning where in the
course of events these very questions arise. The discussion questions
are evidently intended to send the reader to an appendix (pp. 198-215),
which purports to summarize the rules governing professional responsibility. In fact, the section consists mostly of excerpts from the Code,
the Model Rules, and Model Rules discussion drafts pertaining to confidences and withdrawal. If intended for law students, this section
needlessly duplicates material that is more usefully collected in the
rules supplements that students will have bought anyway. If intended
for prospective law students, the section is both opaque and misleadingly incomplete in its omission, for example, of the Model Rules provisions requiring candor toward the tribunal. 66
Although not to diminish the importance of what Heymann and
Liebman have done, I will mention a few more misgivings. I would
have been interested to see more stories and fewer or none of the stock
discussion questions. None of the stories included conveys, for example, what it is like to be in-house corporate counsel and to face the
ethical dilemmas peculiarly faced by them. 67 The special professional
obstacles facing minorities, women, and parents are not highlighted in
any of the stories. Heymann and Liebman embark in the spirit of restoring "credible context," but the pesky casebook rhetoricals that
make up the discussion sections are as tendentious and skeletonizing
in their way as the traditional sources the authors have eschewed. Not
only does this sort of discussion undermine the verisimilitude the authors have striven to attain, its presence encourages students to expect
their ethical ways in the world to be signposted for them. Subsequent
editions of the book, I venture to hope, will carry the editors' worthy
insights all the way through.
Each of the books reviewed here seeks to bring us closer to reality
than the "miles away from life" 68 to which Llewellyn found appellate
opinions - and the casebooks they populate - to be removed.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
67. For example, corporations often retain outside counsel to handle novel and interesting
matters, presumably with the advice and concurrence of in-house counsel. At the same time, the
corporate attorney-client privilege creates incentives to "launder" routine corporate decisions
through counsel, simply to prepare barriers to discovery when litigation (almost inevitably)
arises. There is a price in terms of monotony and diminished prestige that must be paid by inhouse counsel for their relatively more secure and predictable practices. But the security of inhouse practice may be largely illusory if, as it appears, professional standards forbid attorneys
from negotiating contracts that limit their employers' right to discharge them "at will." See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3) (1983) and Comment; MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(4) (1980); Herbster v. North Am. Co.
for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986), appeal denied, 114 Ill. 2d 545,
508 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 (1987).
68. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 38 (1951).
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Luban's insistence on the facts of pervasive economic inequality unseats the comfortable assumption that legal ethics exist in isolation
from issues of distributive justice. Heymann and Liebman insist on
the factual richness of practice contexts, and in so doing they counteract the tendency to approach legal ethics as a subject amenable to
merely technical responses. In the epochal reexamination of our legal
culture that is now well under way, these books are destined to have a
marked impact upon the teaching, practice a11d ethics of law.

